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S O C I A L  T H E O R Y  A N D  P E A S A N T  R E V O L U T I O N  IN 
V I E T N A M  A N D  G U A T E M A L A  
JEFFERY M. PA1GE 
When the first American marines arrived in Vietnam;-in, March }.9~5 they 
were, according to Phlhp Caputo, who was on6 of  them, guided to the 
beaches of Danang (Tourane in Colonial Vietnam) by maps drawn by 
French cartographers. Similarly, American policy makers would have 
found, had they chosen to look, their best guide to the sociology of the 
quagmire .in the works of such French scholars as Yves Henry and Pierre 
Gourou. Gourou's classic The Peasants o f  the Tonkin Delta remains the 
starting point for all later writing about peasant revolution in Vietnam, but 
the long American involvement produced what James Scott has called a 
"boomlet" in the study of peasant revolution in Vietnam and elsewhere. 1 As 
the United States increases its military involvement in Central America it 
seems appropriate to inquire whether any of the scholarly theories developed 
in the earlier experience in Vietnam might generalize to fit still another 
peasant revolution half a world away. Neither sound foreign policy nor good 
social theory can be based on "explanations" which in fact apply only to one 
time and place. Consideration of the Central American revolution and the 
case of Guatemala in particular should provide information about both. The 
goal of this article, however, is principally theoretical; to test theories devel- 
oped to explain one case, Vietnam, in a second and largely independent case, 
Guatemala. 
Scholarly analysis of the problem of peasant revolution in Vietnam has led to 
three different sets of theories, all of which make somewhat different predic- 
tions about the causes of peasant revolution in Vietnam and elsewhere and 
are, furthermore, at least in large part, mutually exclusive. The three theoret- 
ical perspectives might be called moral economy, political economy, and 
class conflict. The first two terms were used by Samuel Popkin in his book 
The Rational Peasant to distinguish his own perspective on Vietnam, which 
he calls "political economy," from the perspective he calls "moral economy," 
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after the title of James Scott's study of depression-era rebellions in Burma 
and Vietnam, The Moral Economy of the Peasant. "Moral economists" 
include notonly Scott but also Eric Wolf, Joel Migdal and, to a lesser extent, 
Paul Mus and his students John McAlister and Frances Fitzgerald. 2 Since 
political economy sometimes implies the Marxist variety associated, for 
example, with the Union of Radical Political Economists, it is important to 
note that Popkin's political economy has a distinctly conservative cast and 
draws not on Marx but on the work of such American political theorists as 
Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, Mancur Olson, Brian Barry, and even 
Edward Banfield. 3 This leaves, obviously, a third interpretation which, to 
distinguish it from conservative political economy and avoid interminable 
debate over what is and is not Marxist, might be called "class conflict." This 
position in the interpretation of the Vietnamese revolution ! claim for myself 
although it is very likely that of the revolutionaries themselves. 4 
The three perspectives - moral economy, political economy, and class con- 
flict - are not products of idiosyncracies of the Vietnamese case but rather of 
regularities in the structure of social movement theory. They are in fact 
representative of three general traditions in the study of social movements 
which Charles Tilly has called, respectively, Durkheimian, Millian and, with 
more courage than I can muster here, Marxist. Popkin and his fellow 
"political economists" can be unequivocally assigned to Tilly's Millian cate- 
gory by direct attribution. Millians, whom Tilly traces to the Utilitarian 
tradition of John Stuart Mill, can be identified by their affection for rational 
individuals guided by explicit decision rules and by their corresponding lack 
of interest in or, as Tilly would have it, fear of, class based political actionP 
Popkin and associates are Millians not only because the subject of his book is 
"rational" peasants but also because he explicitly acknowledges his intellec- 
tual debt to theorists such as Mancur Olson and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and 
Young who are named by Tilly as part of the Millian school. 6 Characteristi- 
cally, Popkin begins his book by evoking an image of Millian calculation in 
this quotation from Pierre Gourou: 
We cannot help being astonished by the subtlety, the intrigue, of which a simple peasant is 
capable, when his wretched appearance might make one believe that he doesn't see beyond 
the muzzle of his buffalo. 7 
The rational peasant, as described by Popkin or by Gourou as well, is 
constantly plotting his individual advancement; and usually, although not 
invariably, at the expense of other less fortunate members of the peasant 
class. Social solidarity insofar as it exists at all in peasant society depends on 
political stalemate or stable dominant coalitions, not on any particular 
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attachment, either social or emotional, to "folk society" or the "little tradi- 
tion" or the "closed corporate village." 
James Scott, Popkin's exemplary moral economist, begins his book on 
depression-era rebellions with a quote from Tawney about the position of the 
rural Chinese population being like " . . .  that of a man standing permanently 
up to his neck in water, so that even a ripple might drown him. ''g The imagery 
of isolated individuals clinging to precarious subsistence in the face of social 
and economic forces which threaten inundation is a central theme in Scott's 
book, although the problem is not so much that drowning is inconvenient 
but rather that it is immoral. Such concerns are characteristic of theorists 
whom Tilly terms "Durkheimian." They share a common fear of the disrup- 
tive effects of industrialism and capitalism an~d view social movements as 
responses to the breakdown of social solidarity during rapid change. It 
would simplify matters considerably if Tilly classified Scott's intellectual 
associates as Durkheimianjust as he classified Popkin's as Millian. Unfortu- 
nately, Eric Wolf, whose Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, like 
Popkin's and Scott's books, was written because of and about Vietnam, is 
directly mentioned by Tilly as an example not of a Durkheimian but, of all 
things, a Marxist. It is true that Wolf shows a critical concern for the ravages 
of what he calls "North Atlantic Capitalism," but then Durkheim was 
equally concerned with the disruptive effects of capitalism on the French side 
of the North Atlantic and Wolf's comments on the consequences of capitalist 
expansion have a decidedly Durkheimian ring. Capitalist markets have 
" . . .  torn men up by their roots and shaken them loose from their social 
relationships, ''9 and for Wolf the "tactically mobile middle peasantry" is the 
main carrier of revolution because it is both most vulnerable to the changes 
wrought by capitalism and most dependent on the solidarity of kin and 
village which these changes disrupt. It is of course difficult to accept the 
taxonomy while rejecting the taxonomist 's judgments, but Wolf's role in 
theorizing about Vietnam is too important to be ignored, Tilly's taxonomy, 
too useful to be dropped, and Wolf, too clearly part of the Durkheimian 
tradition to be reclassified. 
The third classification is the least problematic since Tilly kindly uses Agrar- 
ian Revolution as an illustration and correctly emphasizes that the work is 
concerned with the relationship between interest and action, which is the 
hallmark of his Marxist theoretical type.10 Taxonomy is of course a prereq- 
uisite, not a substitute, for theory, but the neat parallelism between the 
directions of explanation of Vietnam and the three traditions in social 
movement theory indicates that the problems raised by the Vietnamese case 
are general ones. Their extension to a second case, Guatemala, will answer 
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theoretical as well as substantive questions. To do so requires first that the 
principal propositions from each theory be extracted from a reexamination 
of the Vietnamese case. 
Durkheim, Mill, and Marx in Vietnam 
Durkheim: Moral Economy 
Traditional Vietnamese society was, according to the Durkheimian moral 
economists, held together by three elements, which Popkin calls"safety first," 
the village and patron client bonds.11 Safety first, or the subsistence ethic, is a 
moral principle which reflects a widely shared view that a peasant deserves 
just recompense for his labors in the form of a guaranteed if meager subsist- 
ence and that it is the responsibility of his superiors to see that their custom- 
ary rapacity does not extend to the peasant's mite. The peasant may provide, 
as Eric Wolf notes, "three bags ful l-  one for my master, one for my dame and 
one for the little boy who lives down the lane," but he must also provide for 
himself.12 It is immoral for the master to steal not the first three bags but only 
the last, the one that the peasant needs to live. To do so risks not only 
deprivation but a violation of the implicit social contract and revolt. But such 
an implicit contract can be and is violated in peasant society by natural 
disaster or famine beyond even the landlord's control, and, more directly, by 
the extractions of a strong state or by the inequities of a commercial market 
in crops or land. The peasant can be drowned by a natural disaster including, 
literally, a flood, or be submerged by the combined demands of landlords, 
the market, and the state. 
The village, according to Popkin's description of moral economy, functions 
to ease the subsistence crisis by providing communal resources such as 
community land, reciprocal labor exchange, ceremonial funds, communal 
granaries, mutual aid based on kinship or vicinage, or institutionalized social 
pressures to redistribute wealth to gain status in the village civil-religious 
hierarchy. Village social structure, then, functions as a form of social insur- 
ance to protect peasants from violation of the subsistence minimum. 
If village social insurance fails and the subsistence minimum is endangered, 
the lord may still extend a helping hand in the form of patron-client ties 
which, whatever their overtones of paternalism and subordination, allow the 
peasant one more source of money, political influence, and social prestige 
when he needs them most. Rents may be forgiven, loans reduced or interest 
not collected, medical expense paid, burial plots donated, tax collectors 
suborned, and the sherrif dissuaded by a landlord who values social prestige 
and political support more than money. 
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It is, however, at just those times when the subsistence minimum is most 
endangered that the village's insurance system and the patron's generosity 
are likely to vanish. Natural disasters impoverish villages and landlords as 
well as peasants, the market replaces communal ties with calculation and 
turns patrons into rent collectors, and the state, if strong enough, cannot be 
denied by village notables or powerful patrons. The failure of all of these 
mechanisms means that the moral economy of the village will be destroyed, 
that exploitation will become not only unbearable but intolerable, and in 
such circumstances revolt is inevitable. 
Such is the tale of moral economy as told by Popkin. As he admits himself 
many of the nuances are left out and individual theories blurred to produce a 
single theme. Still, the main elements subsistence ethic, village insurance, 
and patrons - are clear. For purposes of this analysis another step is 
necessary - the formulation of an explicit theoretical statement which, based 
on Popkin's analysis, might read as follows: Peasant revolution occurs when 
the subsistence minimum is endangered and village security systems and 
patron-client ties destroyed by (a) ecological pressures (b) the demands of  the 
state or (c) the growth of markets. The worst case for this model would be a 
situation in which a peasant found himself in a perilous natural environment 
confronted by a powerful state in the midst of an economic depression 
without patron or village to protect him. Indeed, this is precisely the situation 
Scott finds in the Vietnamese provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh during the 
Communist rebellions of 1930 31. Burdened with the worst conditions for 
agriculture in all of Vietnam in the best of times, the peasants of Nghe An and 
Ha Tinh, confronted with the worst times in the world depression of 1930 
and finding that French colonial policy had brought the traditional village 
down around them, struck against the state by attacking tax collectors; 
against the landlord by burning land records, against the market by attack- 
ing granaries, and against the moral order by murdering mandarinal offi- 
cials. They also organized the first People's Soviets in Vietnam and set in 
motion a revolutionary wave which, building slowly at first, swelled to engulf 
all of Vietnam in 1975. But this is another story. For Scott and other moral 
economists the peasant revolutionaries are looking back toward the solidari- 
ty of the traditional village not forward toward a new socialist order. If they 
bring about the latter in pursuit of the former this is simply one of many 
examples of the unintended consequences of human actions. 
Mill." Political Economy 
Political economy as developed by Popkin is based on two fundamental 
assumptions: (1) the social solidarity of the traditional village could not have 
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been disrupted by the state, the market or nature because there was little 
social solidarity to begin with; and (2) the individualistic actors of the pea- 
sant village can only be united by individual incentives delivered by efficient 
political organizers. It may be the case, Popkin argues, that the peasant 
village was a corporate communal entity, but within its boundaries (typically 
a bamboo hedge in Vietnam) the appearance of solidarity often cloaked 
individual calculation and greed. True, all citizens participated in village 
affairs, but far from all villagers were citizens; taxes were levied on the village 
as a whole, but were rigged by village notables so that they fell regressively on 
the poor and the weak; insurance funds did work, but at a cost paid by the 
poorer villagers to the rich; communal land existed, but it was often arid or 
under water and good land was raffled off to the politically influential; 
ceremonial expenditures were heavy, but they solidified the control of a 
dominant political machine; village decisions were reached by consensus, but 
this reflected a fear of the dominant faction, not democracy; the rich loaned 
money to the poor but they expected a profit; patrons took as clients only the 
most servile and only when it increased their own influence. The colonial 
state and the market made all of these things worse; instead of destroying the 
village they tightened the control of the wealthy and politically influential, 
and increased the rewards of graft and the power of the ruthless. But before 
and after the coming of the colonial economy the village ran on self-interest, 
a divided collection of potatoes in a sack. 
In such an atomized world collective appeals, revolutionary as well as 
conservative, find little response. Accordingly, the political leader must offer 
individual incentives such as lower rents, equitable taxation, fair land distri- 
bution, insurance that works, irrigation water, or the elimination (often 
physical) of the landlord; and, if he is to avoid the problem of the "free rider," 
must extend benefits only to those who support his program. It is helpful if 
the political organizer is efficient and honest; otherwise he will be seen as just 
one in a long line of corrupt village tyrants. In Popkin's analysis ideology is 
unimportant. Catholic priests, Cao Dai warlords, mad Hoa Hao bonzes, and 
Communist cadre all succeeded because they were honest, efficient, organ- 
ized purveyors of individual incentives. Popkin's argument reduced to a 
single hypothesis might read as follows: Peasant revolution occurs when 
honest, efficient political entrepreneurs organize the delivery of  valuable 
individual incentives to selected members o f  an atomized village. If political 
entrepreneurs more often succeed in non-traditional than traditional villages 
it is because both organizational effectiveness and opportunities for the 
delivery of individual incentives are greater in the former. Popkin notes that 
a subsistence crisis preceded the Nghe An-Ha Tinh soviets in 1930-31, but 
adds that an even worse crisis occurred at the turn of the century with no 
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revolt. The difference? "By 1930 there were more than three hundred Com- 
munis t s . . ,  actively working among the industrial workers of the area and 
urban labor organization was already making an impact. "13 Popkin also 
notes another fact inconvenient for the moral economy theorists: most 
protests in the twentieth century in Vietnam occurred in the Mekong Delta of 
colonial Cochinchina where income and living standards were highest, and 
none in Tonkin, by far the poorest of the three colonial regions and the 
closest to the subsistence margin. The colonial region of Annam, almost as 
poor as Tonkin, was, except for Nghe An-Ha Tinh, generally quiet. Scott's 
strongest empirical case turns out to have been the exception rather than the 
rule in Vietnam. The Communists (and the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao before 
them) succeeded in the Delta because they had more resources to distribute 
in the form of selective incentives. There was nothing to redistribute in 
Annam and Tonkin except poverty. 
Marx: Class Conflict 
Popkin is correct in arguing that the Mekong Delta of colonial Cochinchina 
was the most rebellious area of Vietnam under the French and that the 
narrow coastal strip, most of which was included in the colonial administra- 
tive division of Annam, and the northern coast and Tonkin Delta (Colonial 
Tonkin) were generally quiet. Indeed, my own analysis of Vietnam began 
with a reconsideration of a 1967 RAND corporation report by Edward 
Mitchell which suggested that in the southern part of a divided Vietnam, the 
government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) found its greatest 
support in regions of extensive tenancy, large estates, and export agriculture, 
all of which typify the Delta and that, by contrast, the Communists were 
strongest in areas of traditional village structure and minute owner-operated 
holdings in the Coastal Lowlands. 14 Mitchell's analysis was used by Eric 
Wolf to support his contention that independent small holders, not share- 
croppers, were the main carriers of revolution in Vietnam. The contrast 
between the Mekong Delta on the one hand and the Coastal Lowlands and 
Tonkin Delta on the other, or, to use the colonial nomenclature, between 
Cochinchina and Annam and Tonkin, distinguishes the moral economy 
predictions from those of both political economy and class conflict. On this 
specific empirical point Mitchell, Wolf, and Scott are almost certainly 
-wrong, as both Popkin and I have argued although Wolf disputes the 
clear-cut nature of the comparison and Scott did extend his argument to 
include the Delta protests of the 1930s (he did not include analysis of other 
movements in Vietnam). 15 The Delta was more rebellious not only in the 
French colonial period but, as Bernard Fall had demonstrated, in the early 
post-independence period as well. ~6 This does not, however, necessarily 
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imply that Popkin's political economy theory is correct. Considering much 
the same data on Vietnam but also substantial additional data from world- 
wide patterns of agrarian social movements I concluded that the key element 
of the Delta economy was its class structure, not its potential for selective 
incentives. In particular, I proposed that the well documented radicalism of 
the Delta was a result of class conflict between backward capitalists whose 
only capital was land and a rural semi-proletariat whose only remaining 
claim was to a share of the crop as a wage. The landlords, whom 1 called 
"noncultivators," relied on political influence to secure land and labor, 
lacked the resources to share their surplus with their workers, and refused 
any political compromise. The workers, whom I called "cultivators," severed 
from the conservative effect of the ownership of even small amounts of land, 
limited to improvement in their living standards only through group action, 
and dependent on the worker community for much of what the moral 
economists called social insurance, demanded radical change. The result was 
revolution. Indeed, this pattern appeared to be quite general, particularly in 
agriculttiral export sectors organized in systems of decentralized sharecrop- 
ping such as those in the Delta or in colonial estate agriculture employing 
extensive amounts of migratory wage labor. This analysis leads then to the 
third and final proposition about the causes of revolution in Vietnam, this 
one my own: "A combination o f  noncultivators dependent on income f rom 
land and cultivators dependent on income f rom wages leads to revolution. 
Such a combination o f  income sources is typical o f  sharecropping and 
migratory labor estate systems. ''~7 The empirical prediction about the area of 
greatest revolutionary activity (the Delta) made by this theory is, of course, 
the same as that made by Popkin. Therefore, although the evidence from 
Vietnam seems to provide more support for the political economy or class 
conflict perspectives than it does for moral economy, this evidence alone 
does not distinguish between the two "economic" theories. The regional 
distribution of revolutionary activity in Guatemala, the second case of 
peasant revolution, does permit such a distinction. The predictions of the 
three theories about the location of revolutionary events in Guatemala are 
distinct and in general support the class-conflict perspective more than either 
of the other two. 
Guatemala: Peasant Unions, Military Men, and Guerrilleros 
In October of 1944, Jorge Ubico (1931-1944), the last in a long line of 
militarydictators, was overthrown and the Guatemalan revolution began. It 
has not yet ended. The fall of Ubico and the election of Juan Jos6 Ar6valo 
began a brief era of democratic reform and popular mobilization. But this 
was abruptly halted by the flight of Arevalo's successor, Jacobo Arbenz 
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Guzmfin, and the collapse of his government in response to an invasion by 
Guatemalan exiles from neighboring Honduras. The exiles were organized 
by the United States Central Intelligence Agency but led by a Guatemalan 
General, Carlos Castillo Armas. Castill0 Armas, who was assassinated 
shortly after assuming power, and a new line of military and civilian dictators 
have tried, through a combination of medieval barbarity and modern tech- 
nology, to contain the popular mobilization begun by Ar6valo and Arbenz. 
Despite the slaughter of perhaps 50,000 of their opponents in the years since 
1954 ~s they are at this writing as far from their goal as ever. The Guatemalan 
revolutionaries, like the Vietnamese, show an amazing persistence, although 
thus far they have not acquired the military potency of the North Vietnamese 
infantry. 
Although the "terrorists" who have run the Guatemalan government since 
the fall Of Arbenz have not lacked urban opponents, Guatemala, like Viet- 
nam, is an agricultural country and it is rural revolutionaries and their 
leaders who continue to constitute the greatest threat to the generals' coun- 
ter,revolution. Rural mobilization has taken place in three distinct episodes: 
the peasant union movement, 1952 1954; the guerrilla movement, 
1962-1967; and the guerrilla movement at present. The Agrarian Reform 
Laws of 1952 issued in a brief period of intense union activity among the 
peasantry and led to the formation of some 1,700 peasant unions by 1954 and 
their integration in the National Peasant Federation of Guatemala (CNCG). 
The Federation, with a block of perhaps 150,000 votes, formed a decisive 
political force in democratic elections.19 The CIA-sponsored invasion ended 
both the unions and the lives of many of their organizers. The CIA involve- 
ment in Guatemala was, however, a decidedly mixed blessing even for the 
military officers themselves, and the use of a coffee finca at Helvetia de 
Retalhuleu as a training base for exiles for another CIA invasion, this time at 
the Bay of Pigs, split the military and led to an abortive coup attempt on 
November 13, 1960. The coup failed but a small number of officers led by 
Luis Augusto Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa retreated to the 
wilds of eastern Guatemala and organized a guerrilla war. Beginning in 1962 
it gained considerable momentum, but it was crushed in a massive counter- 
thrust in 1967 by still another military officer, Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio. 
He earned the nickname the "butcher of Zacapa" for slaughtering 
15,000 peasants to eliminate perhaps three hundred guerrillas. 20 In 1967, 
their leaders dead or in hiding, their eastern base liquidated, the guerrillas 
seemed defeated. But by 1980 a reorganized guerrilla movement fielding four 
separate but loosely coordinated commands was posing the most serious 
threat the generals had faced since the fall of Arbenz. In 1966 Yon Sosa told 
Adolfo Gilly that in two and a hal f  years of war his guerrilla front had 
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inflicted 142 deaths on the military and police. 21 On May 16, 1981 the 
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) claimed that in a single action, 
a "claymorazo" or ambush with Claymore mines, it had annihilated a 
military convoy killing fifty-nine soldiers and wounding six, and this was not 
an isolated incidentY Regis Debray had said that the Guatemalan guerrillas 
of the sixties had achieved the greatest mass support of any movement in 
Latin America, with the possible exception of Colombia. 23 The strength of 
the current Guatemalan guerrilla movement seems an order of magnitude 
greater. 
The Ecology of Rural Protest 
As was the case in Vietnam, rural protest in Guatemala follows clear-cut 
patterns of geographical concentration, although, unlike Vietnam, the focus 
of conflict shifts over time. Each of the three movements since the Arbenz 
period had a different regional and ecological base. The areas of concentra- 
tion reflect both the nature of the movements and the regional specialization 
of Guatemalan agriculture. The major ecological regions of Guatemala, as 
they are generally described are shown in Map 1. 24 The North and the 
Caribbean Lowlands, frequently discussed together, are regions of forbid- 
ding jungle, lowland terrain, sparse population and casual swidden cultiva- 
tion. They have been largely empty since the fall of Maya civilization in the 
ninth century A.D., although recently the North has attracted considerable 
attention as a possible site of a large petroleum deposit. The heart of the 
current Indian population, however, is in the Central Highlands, shown as 
the West in Map 1, a rugged, mountainous area with cultivated valleys and 
barren high plateaus. This is a region of microscopic subsistence holdings, 
minute parcel subdivision, intensive cultivation, primitive agricultural tech- 
nology, and acute overpopulation. It is also a region of grinding poverty, 
backbreaking toil, starvation, and death. It is not uncommon to see a man 
laden with a burden of fifty pounds or more walking beside a horse lightly 
laden or carrying nothing at all. The horse is valuable; the man, expendable. 
Every available inch is cultivated, in corn at lower altitudes and wheat at 
higher ones, and it is not uncommon to see the roots of corn plants protrud- 
ing through eroded overhangs beside roads, or corn growing on slopes that 
appear accessible only with the aid of mountaineering equipment. In Viet- 
nam, only in Tonkin and the poorest areas of Annam did one find this 
desperate overcultivation and degrading substitution of human for animal 
labor. 
Agriculture in the Central Highlands cannot support the population. In 
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Lowlands for six months of the year. The Lowlands departments of Retalhu- 
leu, Suchitep6quez, and Escuintla are major destinations for highland mi- 
grants and it is here that most of Guatemala's export crops are produced, and 
these crops are the Guatemalan economy. The nature of coastal agriculture, 
as West and Augelli have pointed out, depends on altitude. 25 The lowest 
altitudes, tropical in climate, were formerly almost exclusively pasture and as 
late as 1960 were underdeveloped because of problems of transportation, 
irrigation, and disease. But since that time pesticides, highways, and bank 
loans have made possible a massive expansion of cotton production and the 
lower coast is now the most dynamic agricultural region in Guatemala56 In 
1973-74, for example, the department of Escuintla alone accounted for 
68.5 percent of total Guatemalan cotton production. 27 At slightly higher 
altitudes sugar cane, bananas, cardamon and other crops are grown. Still 
higher, at altitudes from 500 to 1500 meters, is Guatemala's coffee piedmont 
which stretches through the southern coastal provinces and into the coastal 
extensions of the highland departments of Quezaltenango and San Marcos. 
This is the oldest region of export agriculture in Guatemala. Coffee cultiva- 
tion began on a large scale as early as 188028 and was, until the sixties, the 
only major producer of export earnings and the only major consumer of 
migratory labor from the highlands. The principal producing departments in 
the coastal coffee piedmont, ranked by production in 1974, were San Mar- 
cos, Retalhuleu, Quezaltenango, Santa Rosa, Guatemala, and Chimalte- 
nango. 29 It should be noted that in all southern and some western depart- 
ments, geography and political divisions do not coincide. Many of these 
departments, such as Suchitep6quez, have zones in the Central Highlands as 
well as in the Coast and Coffee Piedmont. Coffee is also produced in a second 
distinct zone of relatively poorer soil but abundant and virtually cost-free 
labor in the north-central province of Alta Verapaz. In both areas coffee is 
produced almost entirely on large estates by a labor force divided between 
resident tenants and harvest migrants. The estates are owned by the ladino 
(the Gualtemalan term for fictive Hispanic descent) oligarchy and worked by 
Indian labor. 
Since the Central Region is largely urban, the remaining agricultural zone is 
found in the Eastern Highlands (the East in Map 1). As the data in Map 1 
indicate, in comparison to the Central Highlands and the Verapaz, the 
population is predominantly ladino rather than Indian and living standards 
are somewhat higher. Overpopulation is not as serious as in the Highlands, 
there are considerably more middle-sized holdings, and agriculture is pro- 
ductive enough to eliminate the need to migrate to work in the export sector. 
In the Eastern Highlands animals rather than people carry the burdens. 
Although most agriculture is subsistence, the acute agrarian crisis of the 
Highlands is largly absent in the East. 
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As the data in Table 1 indicate, the three major agrarian social movements 
which make up the rural phase of the Guatemalan revolution were each 
concentrated in a different ecological region. Column 4 in Table 1 shows the 
number of peasant unions in each province in 1954 as reported by Pearson. 3~ 
The distribution of coffee production was roughly the same in 1954 and 1974, 
with the notable exception of Retalhuleu which was not a major producer in 
the fifties. With a few exceptions unions follow the coffee harvest. San 
Marcos, the largest producer, has the most unions. Quezaltenango, Chimal- 
tenango, Santa Rosa, and Guatemala in the southern Coffee Piedmont and 
Alta Verapaz in the North Central producing area all have large numbers of 
unions. Only Huehuetenango and Escuintla have unions and little coffee and 
only the former is an exception. The Escuintla unions were on sugar and 
banana plantations. As Pearson notes, " . . .  it is probably not unreasonable 
to assume there are at least 1,500 active unions in the CNCG based principal- 
ly on the 1,408 large plantations with over 100 inhabitants on them or the 
1,736 plantations producing over 200 bags of coffee per year. ''3~ The Central 
Highlands, except for Huehuetenango, were quiet during the period of 
peasant mobilization under Arbenz. The plantation proletariat of Escuintla, 
particularly the banana workers, and the tenants of traditional coffee estates, 
were the principal supporters of the CNCG. 
The rebels of the sixties did not, however, build on this peasant base in the 
Coffee Piedmont but rather chose the remote Sierra de las Minas range in the 
East largely, it appears, for military reasons. The military rebellion of 
November 13, 1960 involved two garrisons: Matamoros outside Guatemala 
city and Zacapa in the military district of the same name. The rebels also took 
control of the banana port of Puerto Barrios in Izabal until they were 
dislodged by troops and air strikes flown by Cuban exiles from the training 
base at Retalhuleu. It was "a typical nationalist revolt ''32 and the rebel 
officers, who had no plans to arm the peasantry, seem to have been con- 
vinced to continue their struggle by their outlaw status and, according to 
Gilly, an outright request from eight hundred Zacapa peasants for arms and 
leadership. 33 When, after temporary exile, the rebel officers returned to 
Guatemala to take up the struggle, it was natural that they would return to 
Zacapa and Izabal, departments where they could count on peasant support 
and, at least initially, unenthusiastic military opposition. The mountains and 
jungles of the east also provided favorable terrain for guerrillas, but there is 
no scarcity of such terrain in Guatemala. As Gilly reports: "In February 1962 
under the name of Movimiento Guerrillero Alejandro de Leon 13 de No- 
viembre, Yon Sosa's forces began the struggle in the Mountains of lzabal, in 
the Sierra de las Minas. T M  The Sierra de las Minas are located in the area 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































southern extension of Alta Verapaz; guerrilla units operated in all three 
areas. 35 As Table 1 indicates, however, there were two principal guerrilla 
fronts: the first, the original Alejandro Leon front, led by Yon Sosa and 
named after one of the military rebels killed before the beginning of the 
guerrilla war. Yon Sosa' s organization, called MR-13 after the date of the 
military rebellion, first allied and then split with a broader protest organiza- 
tion called the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) initially dominated by the 
Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT). FAR established a second major 
guerrillafoco, the Edgar Ibarra front, named after a student leader killed in 
Guatemala City, and led by Turcios Lima, in Zacapa. Despite their differen- 
ces, including a Trotskyist preference for mass insurrection in MR 13, both 
organizations, although originally led by nationalist military officers, were 
both revolutionary and socialist. Yon Sosa makes clear the ideology of his 
organization in an interview with Gilly in 1964: 
How did you all become socialists? 
While we were dodging bullets. It's impossible to fight for very long, side by side with 
peasants, and not become a socialist. An armed revolution must become a socialist revolu- 
tion. Which countries, similar to ours, have been able to emerge from backwardness? Cuba, 
China, North Vietnam, North Korea they have all taken the socialist path. A backward 
country cannot advance along the capitalist path, and there is not a third alternative. All you 
have to do is look around and see what's happening in the world. How could we not be for 
socialism} 6 
The reference to Vietnam (italics mine) was not incidental since Vietnam had 
been the topic of an extended discussion among Gilly, Yon Sosa, and other 
guerrillas the night before. Yon Sosa went on to say that both Guatemala and 
Vietnam were engaged in a common struggle to overthrow imperialism ("a 
bunch of bastards") and were part of a world-wide military offensive uniting 
all socialist states. According to NACLA, "By mid-1966 the FAR had 
influence over a wide area in Izabal, Zacapa and Alta Verapaz, and in some 
villages virtually coexisted with the local authorities," and MR-13 had a 
similar influence in the area around Izabal. 37 The nationalist military officers 
had attained this following, as Gilly makes clear, by adapting their ideology 
to the desires of the peasants and rural laborers. 38 Otto Rene Castillo, one of 
Guatemala's greatest poets, who joined FAR under the command of Turcios 
Lima in that same year, 1966, puts it best: 
Por ello pido que caminemos juntos. Siempre 
con los campesinos agrarios 
y los obreros sindicales, 
con el que tenga un coraz6n para quererte. 
V~tmonos patria a caminar, yo te acompafio 
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For this 1 say let us walk together, always 
with the agrarian peasants 
and the union workers 
with he who has a heart to love you. 
Let's go, my country, 1 will go with you.  39 
But 1966 was the guerril las '  high water mark.  Turcios Lima was killed in an 
au tomobi le  accident  in Gua temala  City on October  2, 1966. Colonel  Arana ' s  
counter- insurgency campaign in the East destroyed the Edgar  Ibar ra  front  in 
1967 and Turcios 's  successor, Camino  Sanchez, was captured and executed in 
Gua temala  City in 1968. The a rmy  also crushed the Ale jandro  Le6n front  of 
M R  13, driving Yon Sosa, hunted and alone, to seek refuge in Guatemala  
City. In March  1967 Otto Rene Castillo was captured,  tor tured for four  days, 
and burned alive. The guerril la movement  of the sixties was over. 
Neither Turcios 's  F A R  or Yon Sosa's  M R - 1 3  ever successfully extended 
their  opera t ions  outside their  Sierra de las Minas  base in Zacapa  and Izabal.  
M R  13 planned to organize coffee workers  4~ but  apparent ly  this strategy 
was never carried out. F A R  also organized resistance zones in the Western 
Highlands near  the coast  in the depar tments  of Quezal tenango and San 
Marcos ,  and these fronts,  a l though never as active as the East, survived the 
"Butcher  of Zacapa"  and were still active in the early seventies. 4~ At tempts  to 
extend the guerril la war to the Central  Highlands were, however, a disaster. 
Turcios Lima describes an a t t empt  in November  1962 to organize a guerri l la 
front  in Huehuetenango:  
It (Huehuetenango) is a very mountainous yet densely populated area. The leaders of the 
movement had made no political preparations; they barely knew the terrain and they had no 
support from peasant organizations. They went round and round in circles, vainly trying to 
explain in lightning meetings what they were fighting for. A setback. They were all captured 
and shot...42 
Only in the East did the guerril las gain any significant support .  In the other 
major  ecological  regions of Guatemala  - the Central  Highlands,  the South  
Coast ,  and the Coffee P iedmont  - they were, with the except ion of  minor  
F A R  activity in Quezal tenango and San Marcos,  completely unsuccessful. 
In  1975 guerri l la war came to the Central  Highlands.  In the spring of 1975 
guerril las f rom the Poo r  People 's  Guerri l la  Army (EGP),  a new organizat ion 
founded in 1973, shot Luis Arenas,  the "tiger of Ixcan," an unpopula r  
landowner ,  as he watched his admin is t ra to r  give his workers  their  meager  
pay. The fol lowing day  the guerril las returned and occupied Ixcan  and other  
towns in Huehuetenango.  43 Many  such incidents fol lowed and by 1980-81, 
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as the data in Table 1 indicate, guerrilla actions had engulfed the entire 
Central Highland region and had extended to the South Coast and Coffee 
Piedmont as well. But the old areas of FAR and MR-13 strength in Zacapa 
and Izabal were almost entirely quiet. 
The data in the first column of Table 1 were computed by the author from the 
"Sintesis de Noticias" section of Noticias de Guatemala, a publication of the 
Democratic Front Against Repression which is a broad-based opposition 
group not limited to the guerrilla organizations. The location of the guerrilla 
fronts as listed in column 2 was derived from press releases and other 
publications of the guerrilla organizations themselves. In 1974 there were 
four major guerrilla organizations; they agreed in 1982 to coordinate their 
formerly separate commands. Two of these organizations, the Poor People's 
Guerrilla Army (EGP) and the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), 
were new organizations although, in the case of ORPA in particular, seem to 
have built on the organizational work of FAR. FAR itself reorganized and 
shifted its activities to the South Coast and the jungles of the North. The 
Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) also launched a guerrilla campaign 
although their activities were concentrated in urban areas. 
Table 1 shows the activities of all four organizations reported in Noticias 
from November 1980 to August 1981, although all but two of the actions 
carried out by groups whose identity was given were by the EGP and ORPA. 
This should not, however, be taken as an indication of relative activity since 
Noticias includes both actions culled from the Guatemalan press, in which 
the identity of the guerrillas, often described as bands of heavily armed men, 
is not given, and press reports of the guerrilla organizations themselves. 
Almost all the latter communications are from EGP and ORPA; actions 
reported in Parte de Guerra, the war report of FAR, do not appear in 
Notieias. Communications, needless to say, among these clandestine groups 
are difficult and the government does its best to disrupt them, so it is not 
surprising that some groups appear to have better communications channels 
than others. Noticias does report completely and accurately press releases 
which I have in my possession from both ORPA and EGP. For example, the 
EGP press release, Parte de Guerra of July 24, 1981, lists 24 separate actions 
commemorating the second anniversary of the Nicaraguan Revolution of 
July 19, 1979. Every one of these actions is correctly reported and accurately 
summarized in Noticias. Similarly, an ORPA press release of April 13, 1981 
( Comunicado a la Prensa, Radio y Televisidn) reports a series of actions 
which also are accurately summarized in Notieias. Since the Guatemalan 
press is heavily if selectively censored and the Army secretive, these may be 
the best sources available on the location of the contemporary guerrilla 
movement. 
717 
Table 1 reports only those actions which involve groups, whether or not they 
are explicitly identified as guerrillas, who engage in armed action against 
either military or police forces. This includes attacks on police substations 
a~nd barracks as well as on mobile units; attacks on economic targets such as 
plantations and warehouses; and on elements of the infrastructure such as 
bridges, rail lines, buses, trucks, and oil rigs. It also includes armed actions in 
which violence does not occur if it involves groups of people initiating and 
receiving the action. The most frequent action of this type is the armed 
occupation of a town or farm for purposes of holding a political meeting. It 
excludes assassinations, which are very numerous (they are called "ajustici- 
amientos," "executions," in Noticias) unless they are part of an attack on a 
group of government, police, or military officials, and bombings, unless part 
of a general attack by a group. In the latter two cases the responsibility for the 
action is often difficult to assess and such actions may also be carried out by 
lone individuals far from the guerrillas' base of operations. It should be noted 
that only major actions are included in Table 1: if assassinations and bomb- 
ings were included the number would have been considerably larger. Table 1 
is limited to actions occurring outside of Guatemala City and its immediate 
suburbs, such as Amatitlan, but includes any action occurring outside of the 
Central Region even if it occurs in what passes for a city in rural Guatemala. 
Actions reported together but occurring in different departments have been 
counted separately. Most of the actions fall into two general types: (a) am- 
bushes of police and military units (emboscadas) and attacks on police 
stations and military barracks (ataques); (b) military occupation of towns 
and farms and the holding of mass meetings, distribution of propaganda 
leaflets, and recruitment of supporters (called "toma de lugares," "seizure of 
places," in Noticias), and destruction of agricultural machinery, buildings, 
vehicles, and other elements of the economic infrastructure, often in conjunc- 
tion with an armed occupation (sabotaje). Below are translated descriptions 
of actions of each type as they appeared in Noticias and the original guerrilla 
press release. 
A: Ambushes and Attacks. EGP: Parte de Geurra, July 24, 1981. At 
9:45 hours at kilometer 162, jurisdiction of Cuyotenango we carried out a 
harrassing ambush against a military convoy composed of one truck with 
40 soldiers and one jeep. In the operation we detonated 2 claymore mines 
causing 9 enemy deaths and an indeterminate number of wounded. 
Noticias, August 20, 1981. 
Type of Action Place Org. Result Source 
Harrassing Ambush Km. 162 jurisdic- EGP 9 soldiers Press 
against a military tion of Cuyotenango dead and an Release 
convoy. Claymore Suchitep6quez indeterminate 7/24/81 
number wounded 
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B: Occupations and Sabotage. ORPA: Comunicado a la Prensa, April 13, 
1981. Tuesday April 7. ORPA fighters, in the municipality of Colomba, 
Quezaltenango, carried out a substantial operation of military occupations 
which lasted from 5:00 A.M. to 15:00 P.M. At 5:15 A.M. they occupied the 
Mujuli~ estate and at 6:00 A.M. the estate of Culpan, where they communi- 
cated to the workers the message of the revolution and the accomplishments 
of the popular revolutionary war. At 7:00 A.M. they captured through 
military action, the municipal capital of Colomba where the day before the 
government had forced a demonstration of support for the army and regime 
by threatening the inhabitants. The agents of the substation of the national 
police were forced to withdraw and all the arms of the garrison were 
recovered and, according to the policy of ORPA, the lives and finances of the 
police were respected. Through the local facilities of TGAC an ORPA fighter 
transmitted a revolutionary message for ten minutes and a meeting with the 
population was held in the central park. In the remainder of the action our 
forces occupied the Transito-Bolivar and Providencia Fernandez estates 
withdrawing without difficulty at 15:00 hours. 
Noticias, May 4, 1981, 19. 
Type of Action Date Place Org. 
Result 





4/7/81 Municipal Capital of 
Colomba, Quezaltenango, 
Radio TGAC local 
facilities Estates of 
Mujuli/t Culp~n, 
Tr~nsito Bolivar and 
Providencia Fernandez 
ORPA Distribution of a 
great quantity of 
propaganda. Transmis- 
sion of revolutionary- 
messages. Recovery of 
all arms of the garrison 
The first of these two actions is a typical "claymorazo" or ambush with 
claymore mines, although the guerrillas distinguish two types; harrassing 
ambushes like this one, and ambushes of annihilation in which the intent is to 
completely eliminate the opposing force. The ORPA occupation of a munic- 
ipal capital and several nearby estates is an example of what has come to be 
called "armed propaganda" and was one of the most common guerrilla 
actions both now and in the sixties. The actions reported in Noticias are 
somewhat more likely to be ambushes or attacks on police or military 
installations than occupations and sabotage, although many occupations 
may not be reported in the press where Noticias gets at least some of its 
information. The two best-covered guerrilla organizations also differ some- 
what in the ratio of the two types of actions, with EGP relying more on 
military actions (forty ambushes and attacks versus twenty occupations and 
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sabotage actions), and ORPA slightly more on armed propaganda (forty- 
three ambushes and attacks versus thirty-three occupations and sabotage 
actions), but clearly the tactics of both are very similar. 
The regional distribution of actions by ORPA and EGP differ more markedly. 
The largest number of EGP actions (twenty-one) occurred in El Quich6 
which according to guerrilla sources, is the location of the oldest EGP 
guerrilla organization, the Ho Chi Minh front (also called the Edgar Ibarra 
front in some EGP press releases). The next most active is the adjacent 
department of Huehuetenango, the location of the EGP's Ernesto Guevara 
front. Chimaltenango, at the southern extension of the Ho Chi Minh front, is 
also the site of many EGP actions. It is clear that the core of EGP strength is 
the Maya Quich6 region of the Central Highlands. The EGP also opened its 
newest front (Luis Turcios Lima) in the South Coast department of Escuintla 
and has also been active in the adjacent department of Suchitep6quez. 
ORPA, which had organizational links to the old FARfocos in Quezalte- 
nango and San Marcos, has greatly expanded activity in these two depart- 
ments and in adjacent Solol/t around Lake Atitlfin; it has also operated in the 
southern portions of Chimaltenango while the EGP controls the north. Like 
the EGP, ORPA is also active on the south coast, particularly in Suchitep6- 
quez, and examination of the municipal location of ORPA actions indicates 
that its activities cross all three of the department's ecological zones, al- 
though tending to concentrate in the Central Highlands' municipalities close 
to Lake Atitl/m. 
Actions by groups identified in Noticias follow approximately the same 
general distribution as those of ORPA and EGP, so it is reasonable to 
assume that many of these actions could be attributed to these organizations 
if more information were available. Both organizations have also been active 
in Guatemala City and the EGP's Otto Rene Castillo front operates here, but 
these actions have been excluded from Table 1 because of the restriction of 
the population to rural events. The new FAR has, according to its publica- 
tion Parte de Guerra, been active in two distinctly different regions, the 
remote Peten and the south coast department of Escuintla. Its tactics are 
much the same as those of the two better described guerrilla organizations. 
The most striking difference between this pattern of action and the earlier 
efforts of FAR, MR-13, and the CNCG is the mobilization of the Central 
Highlands. Huehuetenango, where the original military rebels failed so 
miserably, is now a center of rebellion. So is adjacent E1 Quich6 which is 
engaged, as an American embassy spokesmen told the author in August 
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1980, in "a small  scale civil war." That  por t ion  of the Highlands not  organ-  
ized by EGP is control led by O R P A  which has at tained success here never 
reached by the early F A R  a t t empt  in the same region. Only F A R  remains in 
the jungle,  but  even this organizat ion has abandoned  its original eastern base 
and shifted its operat ions  to the even more inaccessible Pet6n. Both O R P A  
and EGP have opera ted  in the Coffee P iedmont  but  this does not  seem to be 
their central  focus as it clearly was for the CNCG.  Both O R P A  and EGP are 
a t tempt ing  to extend their operat ions  to the south coast,  par t icular ly  in 
Suchitep6quez. But the Central  Highlands are clearly their base of opera-  
tions. In summary,  each movement  has a distinct regional base: the C N C G  in 
the Coffee Piedmont ,  the F A R  and M R - 1 3  in the Eastern Highlands,  and 
EGP and O R P A  in the Central  Highlands.  
The change in the regional  base of the guerrillas does not  seem to reflect 
simple changes in guerri l la  s trategy but  rather  far-reaching changes in the 
structure of  Gua temalan  agrar ian  polit ical  economy and social structure. 
These changes were par t icular ly  dramat ic  in the Central  Highlands  and 
created the condi t ions for  the guerri l la successes of the last year. The start ing 
point  for these changes was, as was the case in Vietnam, the t radi t ional  
peasant  subsistence village. Indeed,  if one reads the t radi t ional  e thnographic  
l i terature on peasant  communi t ies  writ ten before 1970 the village social 
organizat ion sounds much like the t radi t ional  Vietnamese village. 44 Wagley 
puts it best: 
At that time (1937) the Indians of Santiago Chimaltenango seldom acknowledged, and most 
did not even know that they formed a segment of the nation,... They considered themselves 
as Chimaltecos, not Guatemalteeos. They respected their own civil religious officials selected 
by the Elders (Los Principales). They considered themselves "muy buen cat6licos" (very 
good Catholics) by that term they meant a firm belief in the Saints as local deities, the 
guardian spirits of the mountains, and the ancestors as supernaturals. They evoked these 
supernaturals through the power of their own rituals which involved prayers led by their 
native shaman priests and offerings of incense soaked in turkey blood. Such communities 
were "loealocentrie," that is, united against outsiders, non-Indian and other Indians alike, to 
the extent of refusing to sell land within their territorial boundaries to outsiders. They were 
endogamous and closed communities and through their localocentrism they had maintained 
their identity despite exploitation and domination by Spanish colonial and Republican rule 
for four centuries. 45 
The civil religious hierarchy, the consensual  rule of the elders, the cult of  the 
guard ian  spirit, the integrat ing power  of ritual,  the corpora te  identity,  the 
communa l  land ownership,  the strict closed endogamy,  the collective resist- 
ence to explo i ta t ion  will all be famil iar  to students of  Vietnamese peasant  
communi t ies  or  indeed to students of any peasant  communit ies .  There is 
something in the t radi t ional  l i terature for polit ical economists  too; it was in 
Panajachel ,  Sololfi that  Sol Tax found that  ra t ional  calculat ion toward  small 
gain that  caused him to refer to its citizens as "penny capitalists. ''46 
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Things have changed in Huehuetenango, where Wagley's village was located, 
and indeed, his intent in the passage quoted above is to underscore just how 
much they have changed. On July 19 of this year a detachment of soldiers 
entered another Huehuetenango village, san Miguel Acatfin, not far from 
Wagley's Santiago Chimaltenango. According to a statement by FP-31, an 
opposition political group: 
The people organized to defend themselves with sticks, stones and machetes. A fierce and 
unequal battle took place from early morning until mid-afternoon, with the military using a 
helicopter and a plane to strafe and bomb the population. An estimated 150-300 persons 
were killed, including children, men, women and aging villagers. 
"The distance which separated the two forces was only a few meters," stated the FP-31. "The 
soldiers yelled 'Lo ng live Lucas !' The people cried 'Long live the people and the revolution!' -47 
The EGP had held an armed propaganda meeting in San Miguel Acatfin in 
early April 1981 and, judging from the villagers' reactions to the troops, must 
have received a warm welcome. 48 Presumably the soldiers were aware of this 
when they went to San Miguel. From "buen cat6licos" to desperate revolu- 
tionaries in a generation. 
There is considerable evidence that these changes are very recent, dating 
from the late sixties or early seventies, and that the Central Highlands would 
not have supported the guerrillas earlier no matter how effective or well-in- 
formed about local conditions they had been. In 1962 Turcios Lima's guerril- 
las found no response when they tried the same tactic, armed propaganda, 
that the EGP has been practicing successfully all over Huehuetenango since 
1975. The FAR guerrillas found no peasant organizations because no pea- 
sant organization existed. Tragically, they had arrived a scant decade too 
soon. In 1966 67, for example, Colby and van den Berghe (1969) studied the 
Ixil region of E1 Quich6, the source of many of the peasants who died in the 
sit-in at the Spanish embassy in January 1980, and one of the areas where the 
EGP has been most active, particularly in the towns of Nebaj, Chajul, and 
Cotzal where Colby and van den Berghe were doing their interviewing. 49 The 
government has been sufficiently concerned about the guerrillas' support in 
this area that it has carried out massacres of unarmed peasants in both Nebaj, 
in March 1980, and at Cotzal, in July 1981.50 Yet Colby and van den Berghe 
could write, and there is no reason to doubt them, that in 1966 67 " . . .  the 
Ixil community itself exhibits considerable group solidarity. This is clearly 
illustrated in the recent revival of traditional religion, resentment of the 
catechists, and recapture of political offices by the traditionalists. ''51 The 
"buen cat6licos" of the civil-religious hierarchy with their turkey blood and 
mountain spirits were holding off catechists who were trying to convert the 
peasants to Catholicism. Where Catholic priests failed, Marxist guerrillas 
preaching Trotskyist world revolution could hardly be expected to succeed. 
722 
But in Aguacat~n, less than ten miles from Nebaj, Douglas Brintnall found 
that by 1975 the village had reached " . . .  some kind of critical point at which 
a maj or social transformation occurs. ''52 The traditionalists had been routed, 
the civil religious hierarchy of Aguacathn had collapsed, and ancestor wor- 
ship was as dead as the kinsmen it celebrated. In 1970, for the first time, an 
Indian was elected mayor and responded by throwing the ladinos out of local 
offices, precipitating a confrontation with the local military commander and 
a minor skirmish with the army. Although the FAR guerrillas found no 
peasant organization in 1962, had they returned in 1975 they would have 
found that a hugely successful one had just been established. On March 2, 
1981 an Army convoy moving through AguacaUin was caught in a "claymo- 
razo" sprung by the EGP. The army unit was wiped out with thirty dead and 
twenty wounded.53 Revolutionary change in Aguacat~n had been terrifyingly 
compressed into less than a decade. 
Similar changes were apparently taking place elsewhere in the Highlands in 
the same decade. Robert E. Hinshaw surveyed selected villages on Lake 
Atitl~n in 1965 and again in 1974 as part of his restudy of Tax's Panajachel. 
In Santa Maria Visitaci6n the cofradias, religious festivals led by the tradi- 
tionalists, were disbanded in 1963 and by 1968 the politicized villagers were 
lobbying the government in Guatemala City for a hydroelectric project. In 
Panjachel itself Hinshaw found that in 1974 "the cofradlas were still staffed 
but with increasing difficulty," and that, "Panajachelefios participated more 
actively in the election campaigning that they had the previous decade. ''54 In 
San Andreas Semetabaj, also on the lake, Kay Warren found that by 1971 
the previously politically passive Indians of what was an unusually wealthy 
community by Highland standards had staged a strike by refusing to enroll 
their children in school unless a dispute with the ladinos over payment for 
school lunches was settled. 55 Here too the civil-religious hierarchy was losing 
ground to a reform-oriented missionary group. 
The guerrillas' success in the Central Highlands reflects deep-seated changes 
in the social structure of rural Guatemala which created the possibility for an 
Indian political mobilization. The guerrillas' operations had shifted because 
the political environment in the Highlands had changed. The location of the 
three movements as well as the successes of the EGP and ORPA in an area 
where FAR had failed, raise fundamental question for theories developed in 
Vietnam. What accounts for the shift in location and the radical transforma- 
tion of the Highlands? There are of course three distinct answers. 
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Guatemala: Moral Economy and Political Economy 
Moral Economy 
The concentration of the contemporary guerrilla movement in the Central 
Highlands, the Tonkin or perhaps even the Nghe An-Ha Tinh of Guatemala, 
would seem at first examination to provide considerable support for moral 
economy. Just as in Vietnam, the region of most intense rebellion is one 
where the subsistence minimum is threatened by primitive agriculture, acute 
overpopulation, and unfavorable agricultural ecology. The demands of the 
state and the pressures of the world market in agricultural commodities are 
also present in the Highlands although they take a very different form than 
they did in Vietnam. The failure of the sixties movement in the East also 
tends to support moral economy theory since the Eastern ladinos were 
considerably further above the subsistence threshold than were the Indians 
of the Central Highlands. The peasant union movement is, however, a puzzle 
for the moral economists since it occurred not in the Highlands, but in the 
Coffee Piedmont among resident estate laborers at a time when world coffee 
prices were high and there was therefore no immediate threat to subsistence. 
An even greater problem, however, is the fact that most of the elements of the 
subsistence crisis have been present in the Highlands since at least the end of 
World War II, if not earlier, yet, as the analysis of social change in the 
Highlands indicates, the receptivity of Highland peasants to guerrilla organi- 
zation is of extremely recent origin. 
There is no doubt that the subsistence margin is and has been in danger in the 
Central Highlands. Statistics on malnutrition and infant mortality make this 
tragically clear. By one estimate 81 percent of Guatemalan children under 
six years of age suffer from malnutrition and 42 percent are born below 
normal weight due to inadequate maternal nutrition. 56 The CIDA examined 
the Civil Register of San Juan Ostuncalco in Quezaltenango and found that 
children under the age of six constitute 55 percent of all reported deaths in 
the municipality, and that in Totonicap/m 10 percent of all deaths were from 
malnutrit ion) 7 Although export agriculture has sparked a long economic 
boom, per capita production of food crops did not increase at all between the 
early fifties and mid-sixties. 58 Between the 1964 and 1973 censuses the 
population of the northwest zone of the Central Highlands increased at an 
annual rate of 2.34 percent, but maize production increased at almost pre- 
cisely the same rate, 2.39 percent. 59 The subsistence crisis did not ease but, 
significantly, neither did it worsen. However, in the seventies the situation 
improved. Maize production increased at a rate of 5.9 percent between 
1973 74 and 1977 78, more than double the historic population growth rate. 
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The village studies of Brintnall, Hinshaw and Warren confirm that at least in 
some areas of the Highlands changes such as the introduction of cash crops, 
fertilizers, irrigation, and the organization of cooperatives began to dramati- 
cally improve Indian agriculture. By 1973 in Aguacat~n, for example, despite 
immense technical difficulties, half of all lands were irrigated. Around Lake 
Atitl~in, Sante Maria Visitaci6n had largely liberated itself from seasonal 
labor by increased commerce in fruit and vegetables, Panajachel Indians had 
taken up coffee production and in San Andreas Semetabaj the local wheat 
growers, whose wealth was based on chemical fertilizers, had expanded their 
cooperative to include 1,200 members in Sololfi, Quich6 and Guatemala. 60 
All of these changes, however, benefit only the land-owning members of the 
communities and there are still plenty of poor landless peasants to supply 
labor for the coastal plantations. The subsistence crisis seems to have eased in 
the critical decade of the late sixties and early seventies when, according to 
moral economy theory, it should have deepened. 
Pressures on subsistence reached the crisis stage, however, long before this 
last decade as careful demographic research by Carmack on the central 
Quich6 Highlands indicates. He estimated that the carrying capacity of 
maize agriculture under primitive conditions, which were the conditions in 
most of the Highlands, would support a population of some 50,000 in central 
Quich6. As the following data indicate, that figure was exceeded as early as 
the 1920s: 61 
Date Population 
1524 50,000 (estimate) 





The subsistence crisis was beginning to be serious by the twenties and was 
acute by 1940. This is also evident in the mass recruitment of Highland 
workers for the lowland coffee estates described by Dessaint in a review of 
the earlier ethnographic literature on the Highlands. During the thirties and 
forties entire villages and even sizable towns were depopulated of adult males 
for much of the year as the men sought employment on the coffee estates. 
Around Lake Atitlfin men from all the villages except the successful capital- 
ists of Panajachel emigrated; Wagley's Chimaltenango was practically empty 
during October and November of each year, when as few as fifty able-bodied 
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men (village population 1500) were left; in San Martin Huehuetenango all of 
the men seen by Tax seemed to go to the coast for half the year; in 
Chichicastenango church bells tolled regularly to mourn the death of a 
migrant on a coastal estate, since as many as 15,000 men from the small city 
worked there. 62 Escape from the subsistence crisis was not found in local 
insurance systems but rather by massive employment in wage labor, much as 
the peasants of Nghe An worked in the nearby industries of the city of Vinh. 63 
The moral economists, of course, did not say that the subsistence crisis alone 
created the potential for rebellion. This occurred only if the crisis were 
combined with human intervention which politicized discontent. Still, if it 
were the subsistence crisis which triggered the revolt it should have occurred 
in 1940, not 1980. Furthermore, the extractions by the state and peasant 
involvement in the market are also of long standing. In Vietnam the state and 
the market demanded rice or money; in Guatemala both demanded labor. In 
Vietnam the French colonial state and its local Vietnamese agents collected 
taxes while the forces of the market determined the price of rice and the share 
rents were set by direct negotiations with local landlords. In Guatemala the 
state and the landlords were virtually indistinguishable and their demands 
were the same - labor in the coastal estates. There is no doubt that the state 
threatened the subsistence margin directly by taking time away from subsist- 
ence cultivation. The result was the same as in Vietnam, but on a much 
smaller scale. Colby and van den Berghe report that in Nebaj in 1936 Indians 
assaulted the local army garrison to protest forced labor and debt servitude 
in an action reminiscent of the depression era rebellions in Vietnam. It 
appears that unrest was a chronic problem in Indian communities through 
much of this century and earlier but before the late seventies it had not, since 
the early colonial period, led to a general insurrection. 64 But the state role in 
labor recruitment was pronounced earlier in the century and, if anything, 
declined after 1944. Before that time labor was recruited through state 
enforced debt peonage (1894 1934) or through vagrancy laws (1934-1944) 
which required 100-150 days labor a year of Indians (but not ladinos).65 The 
state role in labor recruitment diminished after 1944 when the revolution 
abolished the vagrancy code, but by that time the subsistence crisis was 
sufficiently advanced to compel migrant labor by economic pressure alone. 
Thus, the demands of the state, the labor market, and subsistence pressures 
had all reached a crisis stage by 1940, but no revolt occurred until almost 
forty years later. By then, the subsistence crisis had eased, and although the 
demand for labor persisted, the state's involvement in labor recruitment had 
declined. When all three variables specified by the theory were present the 
general insurrecton predicted by the moral economy theory did not occur. 
Agrarian revolution occurred in the right place but at the wrong time. 
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Political Economy 
For  political economy theory agrarian revolution occurred in both the 
wrong time and the wrong place. Theoretically, the guerrillas should have 
succeeded in the East in the sixties, but of course they did not. Although it is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of a clandestine guerrilla organization 
independent of how powerful an insurrection it organizes, there is considera- 
ble evidence that guerrilla organization and tactics in the sixties were not 
significantly inferior to those of the seventies, and indeed, the two guerrilla 
movements  showed striking similarities. The actions of F A R  and M R  13, 
like those of EGP and O R P A ,  were about  equally divided between military 
occupations ("armed propaganda")  and small scale ambushes on military 
units. Indeed, the following description of a F A R  armed propaganda action 
could have been taken from an O R P A  press release: 
... after Panzo's was occupied by the guerrilla squad of commander Turcios, a public 
meeting was held in the square at which the entire village wa present. The guerrilla squad had 
confiscated all arms and supplies belonging to the military post; it had bought provisions in 
local shops, paying prevailing prices. It had then drawn up an agreement which the mayor 
was obliged'to sign in the presence of the villagers. 66 
The structure of the two organizations as well as their largely middle class 
and student leadership was also similar; in the case of both O R P A  and new 
F A R  there are direct structural links between the old and new guerrillas. 
Indeed, the division of the guerrilla movement  into two phases is somewhat 
arbitrary since the struggle continued at a reduced level during the interven- 
ing years. Even the names of the EGP fronts - Turcios Lima, Edgar Ibarra, 
Otto Rene Castillo - reflect the ideological connections between the two sets 
of organizations. The development of  the O R P A  front in Quezaltenango 
and San Marcos depended on the earlier organizational work of F A R  in the 
late sixties. 67 
The sixties guerrillas also followed Popkin's  advice concerning the impor- 
tance of selective incentives delivered by honest effective political entrepre- 
neurs. Both F A R  and MR-13  built their peasant following over a period of 
years by carefully soliciting and responding to the interests of individual 
peasants and peasant communities. The principal selective incentive was, of 
course, land; the Eastern peasantry faced expropriation by expanding cattle 
ranches that often claimed lands that had been cultivated by peasant com- 
munities for years. MR-13  pressured landowners and their administrators 
and often managed to leave peasants in possession of rent-free land. They 
instituted a radical tax-cutting program by eliminating the feudal levies of 
Eastern estate owners. They also established village assemblies for the effec- 
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tive disposition of local disputes outside the rancher dominated local courts 
and even became involved in the settlement of domestic quarrels. These 
committees also cared for the families of peasants killed by the army. There 
were never any charges of dishonesty or maj or scandals involving the guerril- 
las and they seem to have attained an almost mythical status among the 
peasantry. 68 There was also no absence of military training or experience 
among the military men in the first guerrilla wave: Turcios Lima, for 
example, had received ranger training at Fort Benning, Georgia. 69 All the 
guerrilla leaders became sophisticated ideologues well versed in the tactics 
and theory of guerrilla movements in Latin America and around the world. 
They also had Guatemala's greatest poet and, lest cynics suggest that poets 
do not revolutionaries make, consider the poems of Agustinho Neto and 
Ernesto Cardenal. Their organizational cadre was in no way inferior to that 
of later guerrillas, their tactics the same; yet they failed. 
Their failure was a result of the limited potential for mobilization of the 
Eastern peasantry, not the absence of honest, effective political entrepre- 
neurs delivering selective incentives. From the point of view of political 
economy the East is more promising than the Central Highlands since there 
are more free resources to distribute and communication is facilitated by a 
higher level of Spanish literacy. The dirt poor Central Highlands, like 
Tonkin and Annam, have few incentives, selective or otherwise, to offer 
anyone. But this analysis ignores the class structure of the Eastern region and 
this, in the end, appears to have been decisive: " . . .  the majority of their 
peasant base (were) small ladino property owners who were particularly 
susceptible to the government's repressive tactics and some of whom even 
joined the right wing para-military groups.'70 Unlike the Central Highlands, 
here there were many property owners with medium-sized holdings who 
were threatened by the encroaching ranches but were united to them by 
property ownership and ladino ethnic background. FAR and M R - I  3 never 
managed to reach the Indian population on any significant scale, but the 
change process in the Highlands was not sufficiently advanced in this period 
to make such an approach promising. In 1967, while the "Butcher of Zacapa" 
was doing his evil work in Guatemala, another revolutionaryfoco led by a 
talented guerrilla leader with an impressive track record was eliminated in 
Bolivia. Che Guevera, like FAR and MR-13, had selected a region where 
property holdings were small; the owners' conservative instincts ended his 
revolutionary career. 71 Popkin is right that effective organizational entrepre- 
neurs are indispensable for revolution. But they cannot succeed if the under- 
lying class structure blocks popular support. 
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Guatemala: Class Conflict. "No necesitan a los indios'" 
Neither the subsistence crisis nor the guerrilla organization changed much in 
the decade preceding the rebellion of the late seventies. The organization of 
production of Guatemala's agricultural export economy, however, changed 
fundamentally from the traditional Latin American hacienda system which 
had dominated coffee production since the 1890s to a new form of agribusi- 
ness based on a migratory rural proletariat working in the new export crops 
of cardamom, sugar, and, above all, cotton. The change produced a conflict 
between two classes new to Guatemala: cost-conscious capitalists whose 
principal form of capital was still land, and migratory rural proletarians who 
still lived in Highland peasant communities. The results of such a collision 
between capitalists dependent on land, and a rural semi-proletariat was 
apparent in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam throughout the twentieth century. 
In Guatemala the conflict is largely a result of changes in agricultural 
organization in the last twenty, and especially the last ten, years. 
Changes in agricultural organization are in large part a result of the introduc- 
tion of new export crops, although the structure of the traditional coffee 
hacienda has been undergoing fundamental change as well. As the data in 
Table 2 make clear, while production in Guatemala's traditional export 
crops, coffee and bananas, continues to expand, the most dramatic growth 
has occurred in new crops, the most important of which is cotton. Although 
between 1960 and 1978 production of coffee and bananas both increased by 
almost 40 percent production of cotton more than quintupled in the same 
period and sugar production, starting from a small base, increased to over 
150,000 tons by 1978, nearly tripling in the last decade. Cardamom exports 
TABLE 2 
Guatemalan Agricultural Exports, 1935-78, in metric tons a 
Year Coffee Bananas Cotton Sugar Cardamom 
(stems) 
1935 40,812 5,595 - - 
1940 41,896 5,018 
1950 54,843 6,938 - - 27 
1960 79,917 7,254 24,919 687 447 
1970 95,080 6,908 100,467 57,344 N.A. 
1978 131,557 10,050" 131,557 152,954 N.A. 
* Estimated from weight. 
a. Source: Direccion General de Estadistica, no date, 1976, 1980; Adams 1978:357. 
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experienced a dramatic increase a decade earlier and, although the quantity 
by weight is small, this is an extremely valuable spice much prized in the 
Middle East. All of these new export crops as well as the traditional banana 
crop are produced in the lower agricultural zones of the South Coast; and 
this region has also experienced a dramatic expansion of commercial cattle 
production for export. The long economic boom that Guatemala has expe- 
rienced in the last two decades is directly attributable to the dramatic 
expansion of the South Coast agricultural zone. 
These new export crops were produced in new forms of agricultural organi- 
zation rather than in the traditional hacienda which was ill-suited to the high 
land values and intensive, rationalized production of the South Coast. The 
hacienda, however, served as the principal vehicle for Guatemalan export 
production from 1890 until recently and, although modified in form, con- 
tinues to be important in coffee production. The traditional landowner, 
concerned about securing a captive labor supply, lured peasant laborers to 
his estate by giving them small plots of land on which to cultivate subsistence 
crops in exchange for labor on his estate when it was needed. 72 The workers, 
called colonos or rnozos, were essentially sub-subsistence farmers (minifun- 
distas) who happened to live on an estate and shared many of the social and 
political characteristics of mini-subsistence farmers of the Highlands or, for 
that matter, of Tonkin and Annam. Hoyt, describing the situation in 
1946 47, notes that the hacienda left Indian culture unchanged and that 
workers seem unconcerned with changing conditions. 73 About the latter she 
was almost certainly wrong since, as we have seen, these workers were active 
in the peasant union movement less than a decade later. Still, the atmosphere 
of the hacienda was paternalistic and tightly controlled by the estate owner 
who held judicial as well as economic power over his workers. 
Elsewhere in Latin America, notably in Mexico and Peru, hacienda tenants 
have resisted peasant revolutionary movements begun by independent 
communities, and the combination of stable access to a subsistence plot and 
tight landlord control does not seem to be conducive to mobilization. TM Both 
Riklin and Hoyt call the hacienda "feudal" by which they mean manorial, 
but there is little doubt that as Riklin observes of two farms in the San Pablo 
region of Quich6 " . . .  they are a twentieth century incarnation of medieval 
European feudal estates. "75 The landlord's control of his tenant was com- 
plete. A landowner in San Pablo forbade his tenants to congregate in groups 
greater than five and threatened to shoot any priest who set foot on his 
proper ty]  6 in 1946-47 it was still common for landowners to keep a jail on 
their property where they placed offenders against hacienda rules; 77 and 
landowners were so suspicious of outsiders in the early sixties that they 
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refused to allow agricultural extension agents on their property. TM On one of 
Hoyt's estates there had been a radio at one time but the owner took it away 
because it gave so much time (he claimed) to labor propaganda. 79 The owner 
provided inadequate housing and sometimes took care of older residents 
after their working lives were over, but he could easily withdraw these 
privileges at will. Under these circumstances it is surprising not that there was 
so little labor organization, but rather, so much. During times of national 
crisis, like the Arbenz period when landlord control was dramatically weak- 
ened, such peasants could and did organize on a massive scale. But such 
times are the exception. 
Many of the estate workers were, of course, nonresident migrants from the 
Central Highlands, but they lived in temporary barracks-like quarters and 
were clearly subordinate to and largely controlled by both the residential 
community of permanent tenants and the hacienda administration. The 
traditional proportion of resident labor was approximately 45 percent; Hoyt 
reports 12,000 permanent and 16,000 temporary workers on the fifty estates 
she surveyed; the CIDA found a total of 651 resident and 900 temporary 
workers in the six Coffee Piedmont estates it surveyed and Schmid found a 
total of 80,385 resident and 99,000 migrant workers in coffee production in 
1950. 8o With such a large proportion of year-round permanent residents it 
would be difficult for much independent political organization to develop 
among the migrants. Furthermore, the migrants were tightly controlled by 
ladino labor contractors, the enganchadores (v.t. enganchar, to hook), who 
completely monopolized access to estate labor. 8I To work as a migrant 
meant first subordinating oneself to a ladino contractor, then to the estate 
residential community, and finally to the landlord's law. Contractor, com- 
munity, and landlord all reinforced traditional patterns of Indian subordina- 
tion and ladino domination. Perhaps this is why San Miguel Aeatfin, where 
in 1981 peasants died shouting "long live the revolution," was known in the 
thirties as "A good village for plantation labor because Indians generally had 
no serious objections to this type of work. ''82 Those with serious objections, 
of course, could find no ladinos to supply them with work. 
Stockpiling resident estate labor may have had some utility before the 
subsistence crisis forced Highlanders into the migratory labor stream, but 
after 1940 the organization of the hacienda with its inefficent use of land and 
labor and backward technology could not long survive the rationalizing 
forces of the international commodity market. As Quan observes, "with the 
increased possibilities of mechanization, a more than adequate labor supply, 
and the increasing value of land, this system is no longer the most advantage- 
ous for the landowner, and the colono is fast disappearing. "83 The resident 
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Indian estate laborer in export agriculture has become expendable. The 
current attitude toward Indian resident labor is well-expressed by the chilling 
phrase heard increasingly in Central America: "No necesitan a los indios" 
(We don't  need the Indians anymore). 84 What is needed is labor reduced to 
commodity status, not Indian residential communities that eat up land and 
resources. The colono system never made any headway on the South Coast 
which was, from the beginning, organized along rational capitalist lines. In 
the early sixties the CIDA found that such attitudes were the most striking 
difference between estate owners in the Coffee Piedmont and the South 
Coast. South Coast planters were enthusiasts for new ideas and the latest 
technology; they invested heavily in estate improvements and were not afraid 
to take risks. According to the CIDA the owners of the most modern coastal 
estates also wanted to get rid of their permanent laborers to avoid problems 
of under-employment, evade labor legislation, and rationalize manual 
work. 85 To a large extent they have succeeded. Thus it is not surprising to 
find that the ratio of temporary to permanent laborers is higher on the Coast 
than in the Coffee Piedmont. Adams estimates that there were 4,700 per- 
manent employees and laborers on cotton farms in 1965-66, while there were 
between 118,000 and 150,000 migrant laborers. 86 Although the South Coast 
planters have dispensed with resident Indian communities, they have not 
dispensed with the need for Indian labor. Their economic success ultimately 
rests on acute deprivation in the Central Highlands. 
Even in the Coffee Piedmont the hacienda system is beginning to break 
down. While in 1950 the resident laborers constituted 45 percent of all 
laborers, by 1960 their proportion was down to about a third. With this 
change to migratory rather than resident labor in coffee, and the continued 
expansion of the South Coast migratory labor system, came a fundamental 
change in the pattern of class relations. The only connection between the 
South Coast agribusinessman and his worker is money during the harvest 
season. The rest of the year the worker fends for himself beyond the reach of 
estate administrative coercion. Since thereare no longer extensive residential 
communities of colonos, the inhibiting effect of this conservative strata is 
removed. Finally, labor recruiting in cotton seems to have slipped out of 
ladino hands and is now controlled by a new class of Indian entrepreneurs. 87 
Since the Indian migrants now obtain half or more of their subsistence from 
the South Coast economy their dependence on the good will of local land- 
owners in the Highlands is also greatly reduced. To many Indians it must 
appear that it is the ladinos who are expendable. The fundamental changes 
which have come to the Indian villages of the Highlands, then, are a result of 
the fact that many of these villages are not peasant at all but rather temporary 
homes for agricultural wage laborers. Typical of the effect of such changes is 
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Brintnall's description of how peasant leagues came to Aguacatfin. They 
came in the person of a coastal labor organizer brought to the village by a 
native returning from seasonal labor. Focusing on labor issues, not on 
traditional peasant land disputes, the organizer had great success, but only 
among the poor members of the village, who were still largely dependent on 
coastal labor, and had not benefitted from the improvements in agriculture 
in the Highlands. By 1975 there were two noncompetitive leagues with over 
two hundred members. Poor ladinos as well as Indians were admitted, an 
unheard of breach of local racial etiquette.S8 Here was the peasant organiza- 
tion that Turcios's men had sought in vain in the sixties. Aguacat~in, as was 
indicated earlier, is, of course, in the center of current EGP operations 
including a recent claymorazo. 
The collapse of the hacienda system and the increasing independence of 
Indians in agro-export wage labor is also evident in Riklin's account of the 
origins of a protest march on the Guatemalan congress by twenty-seven 
Indians from the remote Quich6 villages of San Pablo and Chimel. s9 The 
problems started when the owner of E1 Soch, a nearby coffee estate, ordered 
the peasants, under penalty of death, to make a one and a half hour detour 
around his estate to go to market. In the past the Indians would have 
grudgingly obeyed. But, of course, times have changed. The EGP retaliated 
by killing the owner of E1 Soch on August 12, 1980 and on August 19 army 
reprisals, in the form of kidnappings, began. The villages of the Highlands 
had been long accustomed to losing men to kidnappers both for the army 
and for forced labor. But this time instead of acquiescing they went to the 
capital, an act of unheard-of audacity. 
The farmers of Chimel and San Pablo are dependent on Coastal wage labor 
for half or more of their subsistence. They spent that money at the market, 
which could now be reached only by a forced detour around E1 Soch. E1 Soch 
itself and the adjoining farm of E1 Rosario are both in economic difficulties 
since they are traditional haciendas worked by resident colonos and their low 
productivity and poor management have made themincreasingly uncompeti- 
tive in a coffee economy dominated by agribusiness. It was not the residents 
of the traditional commercial haciendas who went to Guatemala City but 
rather the migratory wage laborers who still lived in the independent villages 
of San Pablo and Chimel. From hacienda to migratory labor estate and from 
Indian to proletarian: the changes in San Pablo are a microcosm of the shifts 
in the Guatemalan agricultural economy as a whole. It is these changes, not 
the subsistence crisis or the EGP's superior organization, which have created 
the conditions for revolution in the Central Highlands of Guatemala. 
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There is one more piece of evidence supporting the class-conflict interpreta- 
tion, although it is not beyond dispute: the theories of the guerrillas them- 
selves. As was the case in Vietnam, successful political entrepreneurs seem to 
view their struggle in class-conflict terms. Here is the EGP's position from its 
magazine Compa~qero. 
9 poor peasants . . ,  minifundistas (owners of sub-subsistence plots) have no other choice 
than to migrate periodically to the coast, if they are to survive. This reality constitutes one 
aspect of the inextricable relationship between the latifundio and the minifundio; the other 
aspect is the landowners' reliance on this migrant labor force...  Within this process of 
capitalist transformation, the Indian peasants have become wage workers part of the year or 
semi-proletarians. 9~ (Italics mine.) 
According to the EGP the Indians' only choice is to join the Popular 
Revolutionary War and it is clear that it is these "semi-proletarians" that it 
expects will join. 
The transformation from hacienda to agribusiness has had one other major 
effect on the Highland peasantry. Increasing land values and prospects for 
agro-export development have precipitated large-scale land grabs through- 
out the Highlands, particularly in the so-called Northern Transversal Strip 
which includes the northern third of Huehuetenango, E1 Quich6, and Alta 
Verapaz. 9~ General Romeo Lucas Garcia himself, Guatemala's most recently 
deposed presidential general, is rumored to personally own a substantial 
tract in the area, variously estimated from 18,000, to 130,000 acres. 92 Other 
large tracts are owned by many other officers as well as by a "who's who of 
Guatemalan society. ''93 The area is also becoming important as a possible 
southern extension of the great Mexican petroleum fields.94 All of this wealth 
sits under land occupied by Indian communities and traditional haciendas. 
No necesitan a los indios. The generals' current s!aughter of entire Indian 
villages at Chajul, Cotzal, Nebaj, San Miguel Acat~in, San Martin Jilote- 
peque, and Panzos in this region combines a grim economic as well as 
political logic. Eliminating the population will eliminate the guerrillas and also 
free the land for development. The parasitic relationship between the hacien- 
da and the Indian village is being destroyed by military agribusinessmen 
whose viciousness apparently knows no limits. If they survix~e the generals' 
onslaught, the peasants' last connection to the land will be severed and they 
will be completely dependent on agro-export wage labor. 
In their long involvement in Vietnam, Americans never listened to the 
revolutionaries' own account of the origins of their conflict. Had they, they 
would have heard the same message as in the passage from the EGP quoted 
above: class conflict generated by the collision between a n  agricultural 
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p ro le ta r i a t  and  capi tal is t  l andowner s  in a per iphera l  e x p o r t  e c o n o m y  has the 
p o w e r  to genera te  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  conf l ic t  of  exp los ive  power .  In V ie tnam the 
conf l ic t  was be tween  l andowner s  and  share  tenants ,  in G u a t e m a l a  it is 
be tween  mil i tary  agr ibus inessmen  and mig ra to ry  prole tar ians ,  but  the results 
have  been  r e m a r k a b l y  similar .  Ne i the r  mora l  e c o n o m y  nor  pol i t ical  e c o n o m y  
has the p o w e r  to exp la in  the or igins  of  the conf l ic t  in bo th  na t ions  or  to 
reflect  the views of  the revo lu t ionar ies  themselves .  Perhaps  it wou ld  not  
surprise M a r x  to learn that  careful  analysis of  the o rgan iza t ion  of  p roduc t i on  
wou ld  p rov ide  the key to an  unde r s t and ing  of  r evo lu t iona ry  change,  but  it 
seems to be s o m e t h i n g  of  a surprise to recent  theor is ts  of  peasan t  revolu t ion .  
It is a lesson that  they could  well take to heart .  
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